A decentralized fault-tolerant control scheme based on Active Fault Diagnosis by Raimondo, DM et al.
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Abstract— This paper deals with a decentralized fault-
tolerant control methodology based on an Active Fault Diagnosis
approach. The proposed technique addresses the important
problem of monitoring interconnected Large-Scale Systems
(LSS). The fault diagnosis approach is made of a passive
set-based fault detection method and an active fault isolation
technique, able to guarantee isolability subject to local input
and state constraints. The proposed scheme can be imple-
mented locally in a decentralized way. A significant feature
is the decentralized design constructed on tube-based Model
Predictive Control to possibly allow the disconnection of faulty
subsystems or the reconfiguration of local controllers. The
Active Fault Diagnosis tool is designed to support the decision-
making process for the control and monitoring of the LSS.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the problem of monitoring Large-Scale
Systems has attracted increasing interest in academia and
industry. Some distributed architectures have been developed
for distributed Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI) (see as
example [1], [2], [3], [4], [5]). These works rely on passive
FDI methods, in which the status of healthy of the system is
analyzed by comparing input-output data for the closed-loop
system with a process model or historical data. One of the
issues when dealing with passive FDI approaches is that the
feedback controller may hide the presence of faults by com-
pensating their effects (see as example [6]) and making fault
detection and isolation more difficult or even impossible.
Instead, active FDI approaches consist in suitably modifying
the control input to improve fault detectability and isolability
capabilities [7], [8], [9]. However, one of the limitations of
these approaches is the possibly high computational cost and
complexity [10] that has prevented their use in the context
of LSS systems. In order to overcome this issue, in this
paper we propose a decentralized architecture, where a linear
LSS composed of a (possibly large) number interconnected
subsystems is considered and each subsystem is monitored
by a local fault diagnoser (see [3]), implementing a passive
set-based fault detection method and an active fault isolation
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approach, guaranteeing isolability subject to local input and
state constraints. To the best of the authors’ knowledge,
this is the first time that an Active Fault Diagnosis ap-
proach is proposed in a decentralized architecture for the
monitoring of LSS. Moreover, a decentralized active Fault
Tolerant Control (FTC) scheme is proposed where – in
healthy modes of behavior – the subsystems are robustly
controlled by a decentralized tube-based Model Predictive
Control (MPC) (similarly as in [11]) and monitored by a set-
based passive fault detection method. After fault detection,
the Active Fault Isolation tool supports the decision-making
process. The goals are, if feasible, the isolation of the fault
and the reconfiguration of the local controllers according
to the new identified dynamics. We take advantage of the
decentralized design of the local controllers to possibly allow
the disconnection of faulty subsystems when the local control
reconfiguration is not feasible.
In the literature, FTC methods are classified as either
active or passive [12]. Passive FTC refers to the design
of controllers that are robust to potential faults without
modification, while active FTC schemes modify the control
law in response to a fault [13], [14], [15], requiring therefore
methods for the detection and isolation of the faults. These
methods typically assume that the faults are detected and
isolated correctly and instantaneously, or that the faults occur
in the absence of disturbances and measurement noise so
that FDI is fast and accurate. These assumptions do not hold
in real systems and delays and errors in FDI can lead to
problems such as instability, violation of state constraints,
and the inability to implement the suitable controller after
isolation [16]. These issues can be mitigated by the use of
active FDI methods. The use of such methods in the context
of active FTC has been limited to the centralized case [10],
[17], [18]. As far as the distributed/decentralized case is
concerned, the contributions about fault-tolerant schemes are
more recent, but either they assume to know the FDI results
as given correct elements (see [19], [20] as examples) or they
use passive techniques, as in [6], where a distributed passive
FDI is integrated with distributed MPC in a PnP scenario for
nonlinear systems. On the other hand, the main contribution
of the paper is a decentralized active FTC scheme using
Active Fault Isolation, for the monitoring and control of
interconnected subsystems.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a discrete-time affine large scale system com-
posed of N subsystems. Each subsystem obeys one of nmi
possible dynamics (all known and observable). When model
local measurements
physical coupling
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Fig. 1. The proposed decentralized architecture. The subsystems are
physically interconnected. Each subsystem is controlled by a local controller
Ci and monitored by a local diagnoser Di, both taking measurements from
the local subsystems. After fault detection, the Active fault isolation tool
may compute an input control sequences to allow the isolation of the fault.
mi ∈Mi = {1, · · · ,nmi} is active, the subsystem i ∈ N =
{1, . . . ,N} is governed by the following set of equations
x[mi]i (k+1) = A
[mi]
ii x
[mi]
i (k)+B
[mi]
i ui(k)+w
[mi]
i (k)+ r
[mi]
i (1)
w[mi]i (k) =∑
j∈Ni
A[mi]i j x
[mi]
j (k)+di(k) (2)
where x[mi]i (k) ∈ Rnxi , ui(k) ∈ Rnui denote respectively the
states and the inputs of subsystem i. The constant vector
r[mi]i is used to model additive faults, e.g. actuator offsets,
while vector w[mi]i (k) ∈ Rnxi accounts for the coupling with
neighbouring subsystems and the presence of process noise
di(k). The set of neighbours to subsystem i is defined as
N
[mi]
i = { j ∈N : A[mi]i j 6= 0, i 6= j}. Matrices A[mi]i j ,∀i, j ∈N
are blocks of matrix A[mi], where this latter represents the
dynamic matrix of the overall system. It is assumed that
(A[mi]ii ,B
[mi]
i ) is stabilizable for all i ∈N , mi ∈Mi.
The objective of this work is to provide a decentralized
FTC scheme which benefits of an active fault diagnosis
strategy. Each subsystem is governed by a local controller
and monitored by a local fault diagnoser, as illustrated in
Fig. 1. Each subsystem is governed by a model predictive
controller, subject to local input and state constraints, i.e.
x[mi]i (k) ∈ Xi,ui(k) ∈ Ui, and robust to w[mi]i (k) ∈ W [mi]i =
∑ j∈Ni A
[mi]
i j X j+Di, with Di bounding the process noise di(k).
For each i ∈N , sets Xi,Ui,Di, and consequently W [mi]i , are
all zero-centered zonotopes (see §III) known a priori. In order
to guarantee robust stability and constraint satisfaction for the
overall system, the local controllers are designed according
to [21] (summarized in §IV). For each i ∈N , we assume
mi = 1 represents the nominal dynamics, while the other
models describe possible faulty dynamics. The local control
laws are synthesized off-line for every model mi ∈Mi. Each
subsystem is monitored in healthy conditions by a passive
set-based fault detection method. When a fault is detected in
a local subsystem at time kd , the related controller is put in
stand-by and a local active FDI procedure initiated (§V-B).
Active FDI aims to determine which dynamics subsystem i is
subject to, by injecting a minimally harmful (in length and/or
norm) sequence (ui(kd), · · · ,ui(kd+Ti−1)) able to guarantee
that any possible state (or state sequence) of subsystem i at
time kd +Ti is consistent with only one mi ∈Mi. In order
to not spoil the stability properties of the overall system,
such procedure is performed while guaranteeing that the local
subsystem evolves within its state bounds Xi, regardless of
the active fault mode mi. It is assumed that the diagnosis is
fast enough to avoid the switching between models during
[kd , · · · ,kd+Ti]. Moreover, we assume that there are no faults
occurring in parallel on multiple subsystems, i.e. faults affect
only one subsystem at a time. Once the fault is isolated, the
local controller is reconfigured in order to still guarantee the
stability and constraint satisfaction of the overall system.
III. NOTATION AND BASIC DEFINITIONS
A tilde is used to indicate sequences associated with
(1)-(2). When referring to u˜i(l:k), w˜i(l:k), the notation stands
for σ˜ (l:k)=(σ(l),. . .,σ(k−1)), while σ˜ (l:k)=(σ(l),. . .,σ(k))
for x˜i(l:k) Similarly, one has σ˜ (k) = (σ(0),. . .,σ(k−1)) or
σ˜ (k) = (σ(0),. . .,σ(k)). The notation σ˜ (l:k|l) indicates that
the sequence is computed at time l. For each subsystem i,
the state of model mi, k-steps ahead, is given by the function
φ [mi]i{k}(u˜i(k),x
[mi]
i (0), w˜
[mi]
i(k)) with φ
[mi]
i{k} :R
nui k×Rnxi×Rnxi k→ Rnxi
the state solution map. The notation W˜{k}=W×. . .×W is used
to indicate the k-th cartesian product of a set W . Zonotopes
are centrally symmetric convex polytopes. Denoting with
G=[g1 . . . gng ]∈Rn×ng the generator matrix and with
c∈Rn the zonotope center, the set can be expressed as
Z={Gξ+c:‖ξ‖∞≤1}, and compactly indicated as Z={G,c}.
The order of a zonotope is defined as ng/n. Zonotopes
complexity (which depends on the number of generators)
can be reduced by outer approximating zonotopes using sets
with less generators [22]. Given an initial condition x[mi]i (k0),
a sequence u˜i(k0:k|k0) and a set W˜
[mi]
i{k−k0}={GW˜ [mi]i{k−k0}
,0} the
state reachable set at time k is defined as
X
[mi]
i(k|k0)(u˜i(k0:k|k0),x
[mi]
i (k0),W˜
[mi]
i{k−k0})
={φ [mi]i{k0−k}(u˜i(k0:k|k0),x
[mi]
i (k0),w˜
[mi]
i(k0:k)
):w˜[mi]i(k0:k)∈W˜
[mi]
i{k−k0}}
When clear from the context, the arguments of sets and maps
will be omitted. Thanks to zonotope properties (5)-(7) in
[23], by iterating the state dynamics (1), one obtains suitable
matrices B˜[mi]wi{k−k0}, etc., such that
X
[mi]
i(k|k0)=
{[
B˜[mi]wi{k−k0}GW˜ [mi ]i{k−k0}
]
,φ [mi]i{k−k0}(u˜i(k0:k|k0),xi(k0)
[mi],0)
}
Note that u˜i(k0:k|k0) affects only the center of these sets.
IV. DECENTRALIZED MPC
The proposed FTC method assumes that each subsystem
is equipped with a tube-based robust MPC controller which
is designed, for each i ∈ N ,mi ∈Mi, according to [21].
The approach is briefly recalled in the following.
In a decentralized tube-based robust MPC approach,
the control action for each i ∈N is given by the sum of
two terms: (i) a nominal input, obtained by solving, at each
k, an optimal control problem subject to the nominal model
x[mi]i (k+1) = A
[mi]
ii x
[mi]
i (k)+B
[mi]
i ui(k)+ r
[mi]
i (3)
and (ii) a linear feedback term designed to track the
prediction of this nominal model. These terms are here
described in reverse order.
Let K[mi]i ∈ Rnui×nxi be so that A[mi]Ki ≡ A
[mi]
ii +B
[mi]
i K
[mi]
i is
Schur. Define e[mi]i (k)≡ x[mi]i (k)−x[mi]i (k) the tracking error
between the nominal state x[mi]i (k), solution of (3) with
nominal input ui(k), and the real state x
[mi]
i (k), obtained by
solving (1) with ui(k) = ui(k) + K
[mi]
i (x
[mi]
i (k)− x[mi]i (k)).
This error obeys the dynamics
e[mi]i (k+1) = A
[mi]
Ki e
[mi]
i (k)+w
[mi]
i (k) (4)
Thanks to the stability of A[mi]Ki and the boundedness of W
[mi]
i
(resulting from the bounds X j, j∈Ni), ∃E [mi]i ⊂Rnxi such that
A[mi]Ki E
[mi]
i +W
[mi]
i ⊂ E [mi]i . If e[mi]i (0) ∈ E [mi]i and w[mi]i (k) ∈
W [mi]i , ∀k ∈ N, then the solution of (4) satisfies e[mi]i (k) ∈
E [mi]i , ∀k ∈ N. E [mi]i is a robust positively invariant set and
can be computed as described in [24]. We select E [mi]i to
be the minimal robust positively invariant set. Note that the
computation of each E [mi]i requires the knowledge of the state
constraints of the neighbouring subsystems N [mi]i only.
A robust MPC controller can be obtained, for each sub-
system i, by appending the feedback term K[mi]i (x
[mi]
i (k)−
x[mi]i (k)) to a nominal input ui(k), obtained by solving the
finite horizon optimal control problem (FHOCP) below for
system (3)
min
x˜[mi ]i(k:k+N)
u˜[mi ]i(k:k+N−1)
∑k+N−1t=k
[
x¯[mi]i (t)
TQ[mi]i x¯
[mi]
i (t)+ u¯
[mi]
i (t)
TR[mi]i u¯
[mi]
i (t)
]
+ x¯[mi]i (k+N)
TP[mi]i x¯
[mi]
i (k+N)
subj. to dynamics (3)
x¯[mi]i (k) ∈ x[mi]i (k)⊕E [mi]i
x¯[mi]i (t) ∈ X [mi]i , t ∈ [k,N−1]
u¯[mi]i (t) ∈U [mi]i , t ∈ [k,N−1]
x¯[mi]i (k+N) ∈ X [mi]fi
where Q[mi]i ≥ 0,R[mi]i > 0. The terminal set X [mi]fi ⊆ X
[mi]
i
and the terminal penalty P[mi]i ∈ Rnxi×nxi , and the matrix
gain K[mi]i ∈ Rnui×nxi are computed in order to satisfy the
usual stability conditions for (3) (Assumptions 2 and 3 in
[25]). The problem above is required to satisfy the tightened
constraints U [mi]i ≡Ui	K[mi]i E [mi]i and X [mi]i ≡ X [mi]i 	E [mi]i .
Remark 1: Note that, in order Problem (5) to be feasible,
it is necessary that both U [mi]i and X
[mi]
i are non-empty. In
order this to hold, the effect of the process noise and the
coupling between subsystems is required to be sufficiently
small.
Let F¯ [mi]i denote the set of initial conditions x¯
[mi]
i
for which the problem above is feasible. Let F [mi]i =
F¯ [mi]i ⊕ E [mi]i . Denoting the optimizers of the FHOCP as
(x˜[mi]i(k:k+N), u˜
[mi]
i(k:k+N−1)), the tube-based MPC feedback law
κ [mi]i : F
[mi]
i → Rnui is defined as
κ [mi]i (x¯
[mi]
i (k)) = u¯
[mi]
i (k)+K
[mi]
i (x
[mi]
i (k)−x[mi]i (k)) (5)
Finally, the following theorem summarizes the properties of
the robust MPC scheme above.
Theorem 1: Assume that x[mi]i (0) ∈ F [mi]i and w[mi]i (k) ∈
W [mi]i , ∀k ∈ N and that no faults have occurred in
the LSS. Then the system (1) in closed loop with
κ [mi]i satisfies (u
[mi]
i (k),x
[mi]
i (k)) ∈ Ui × Fi, ∀k ∈ N, and
limk→∞ d(x
[mi]
i (k),E
[mi]
i )→ 0 exponentially fast.
Proof: The result follows from [21].
Define m= [m1, · · · ,mN ], F [m] = F [m1]1 ×·· ·×F [mn]N , E [m] =
E [m1]1 × ·· · × E [mn]N . The decentralized tube based MPC
summarized above guarantees the robust stability of set
E [m] and constraint satisfaction for the overall system: if
x[m](0) ∈ F [m],∀i ∈ N , then x[m](k) ∈ F [m],∀k ∈ N, and
limk→∞ d(x[m](k),E [m])→ 0.
V. ROBUST FAULT DETECTION AND ISOLATION
This section presents the FDI procedures used in the
proposed FTC approach. In the time interval [0,kd ], the
nominal model mi = 1 is believed to be active and ui(k)
is determined using K[1]i . At the same time, passive fault
detection is done using a set-based approach as described
in §V-A. After fault detection, in the interval [kd ,kis], active
fault isolation is carried out, as described in §V-B.
A. Passive Fault Detection
According to the tube based MPC approach described
above, if e[mi]i (0) ∈ E [mi]i and w[mi]i (k) ∈W [mi]i , ∀k ∈ N, then
e[mi]i (k) ∈ E [mi]i , ∀k ∈ N. This property is very useful for
detecting, in a decentralized way, the presence of a possible
fault in subsystem i. At each time step k+ 1, given the
nominal state x[mi]i (k+1) obtained by solving the FHOCP at
time k, we compute the error e[mi]i (k+1) between x
[mi]
i (k+1)
and the real state x[mi]i (k+1). If, at any k+1 > 0,
e[1]i (k+1) /∈ E [1]i (6)
then, the nominal model mi = 1 is not consistent with
the behaviour of the subsystem, i.e. a fault has occurred
in subsystem i. While this approach allows to detect the
presence of a fault, due to the presence of w[mi]i the passive
isolation of the malfunction could be challenging. For this
reason, in the following, we suggest to use a decentralized
version of the active FDI scheme proposed in [8].
B. Active Fault Isolation
Suppose condition (6) is verified at time kd , indicating
that a fault occurred at some k f with 0 ≤ k f < kd . Assume
no further faults occur in the LSS between k f and the time kis
at which isolation is completed. Moreover, assume that, for
the system which is affected by a fault, the state dynamics
stays within bounds between k f and kd . At kd , the active
model mi is unknown except that mi 6= 1.
Denote with xˆi(kd) the state value at time kd (the super-
script argument is omitted, since, at this stage, the nature of
the fault is unknown). DefineM+i ≡Mi\{1}. The objective
of decentralized active fault isolation is to isolate the local
malfunction by driving the system to a state condition which
can be explained by one faulty model only. In other words,
given x[αi]i (kd)= xˆi(kd), x
[βi]
i (kd)= xˆi(kd), we look for the ex-
istence of a local sequence u˜i(kd :kd+Ti|kd) leading to x
[αi]
i (kd+
Ti) 6= x[βi]i (kd + Ti), for all (w˜[αi]i(kd :kd+Ti|kd), w˜
[βi]
i(kd :kd+Ti|kd)) ∈
W [αi]i ×W [βi]i , and all αi 6= βi with αi,βi ∈M+i . This cor-
responds to verifying the separation of the state reachable
sets at time kd + Ti, i.e. X
[αi]
i(kd+Ti|kd)(u˜i(kd :kd+Ti|kd), xˆi(kd))∩
X
[βi]
i(kd+Ti|kd)(u˜i(kd :kd+Ti|kd), xˆi(kd)) = /0 for all the possible
faulty dynamics M+i (assuming that Mi is exhaustive). For
ease of reading, in the following, the dependence of the
reachable sets on W [αi]i , W
[βi]
i will be omitted. In order to
obtain the minimally harmful (in terms of length/norm) input
sequence guaranteeing diagnosis we solve
min
u˜i(kd :kd+Ti |kd )
‖u˜i(kd :kd+Ti|kd)‖22 (7)
subj. to dynamics (1)− (2) (8)
x[mi]i (kd) = xˆi(kd), ∀mi ∈M+i (9)
ui(k) ∈Ui, k ∈ [kd ,kd+Ti−1] (10)
X
[mi]
i(k|kd) ⊆ X
[mi]
i , k ∈ [kd ,kd+Ti−1] (11)
X
[mi]
i(kd+Ti|kd) ⊆ F
[mi]
i , ∀mi ∈M+i (12)
X
[αi]
i(kd+Ti|kd)∩X
[βi]
i(kd+Ti|kd) = /0, αi 6= βi (13)
with increasing Ti= 1, · · · until the problem becomes feasible
or a Tmax is attained. For each i ∈ M+i , constraint (11)
ensures that x[mi]i (k) ∈ X [mi]i for all k ∈ [kd ,kd + Ti − 1].
Similarly, for each i ∈M+i , the constraint (12) ensures that,
at the end of the isolation horizon, x[mi]i (kd + Ti) ∈ F [mi]i .
As shown in §IV, the satisfaction of this constraint ensures
that the controller κ [mi]i can be feasibly implemented at time
kd + Ti for any possible fault mi ∈M+. According to [8],
the problem above can be reformulated as a mixed-integer
quadratic program (MIQP) which can be solved using, e.g.
CPLEX [26].
Remark 2: Note that, the satisfaction of constraint (12)
may be difficult in general. However, if problem (7) is not
feasible, we can still unplug the subsystem where the fault
was detected and still preserve the overall stability (see §VI).
Fig. 2. The proposed FTC strategy. Three possible scenarios are considered
by the Active Fault Isolation procedure.
Finally, by injecting u˜i(kd :kd+Ti|kd), solution of problem
(7), into subsystem i, fault isolation is obtained in at most
Ti steps by verifying which reachable set X
[mi]
i(k|kd) the real
xi(kd +Ti) belongs to. Since the problem above guarantees
the isolability for all the possible realizations of w˜[mi]i , it is
possible to obtain an earlier isolation, i.e. at time k< kd+Ti
xi(k) is already consistent with one model mi only. Note
that, rather than applying the entire sequence u˜i(kd :kd+Ti|kd),
it is possible to apply the Active FDI approach above in a
closed-loop fashion by re-solving problem (7) at each time
step with the newly available state [27].
VI. FTC STRATEGY
In this section we detail how we can use the tools we have
introduced in the previous sections for the proposed FTC
strategy. At time k = 0, the nominal model m= 1 is active.
During healthy nominal behaviour, before fault detection,
each subsystem is controlled by the decentralized tube-based
MPC introduced in §IV and monitored by the passive fault
detection method in §V-A. At time k f , a single fault occurs
in subsystem i and is detected at time kd > k f (if the effect
of the fault cannot be explained by the local uncertainties
represented by w[mi]i ). At time kd , the Active Fault Isolation
tool (see §V-B) is activated. Three possible scenarios can be
in place, illustrated in Figure 2.
Scenario 1. There exists a control input sequence so that
Problem (7) is feasible, i.e. i) it is possible to separate the
reachable sets of the different faulty dynamics (achieving
therefore fault isolation) ii) the state after fault isolation
is guaranteed to remain in the domain of attraction, mak-
ing feasible the reconfiguration of the i-th local controller
designed as in §IV for the identified model mi 6= 1. More
specifically, applying the input computed by the Active
Fault Isolation tool, the fault is isolated at most at time
kd +Ti, identifying which model mi ∈Mi, mi 6= 1 is acting
in the local subsystem i. Furthermore, the computed input
guarantees that x[mi]i (kd +Ti) ∈ F [mi]i . At time kd +Ti, once
to the novel “nominal” dynamics is isolated, its controller is
implemented continuing to guarantee the stability of the LSS;
it will be not necessary to disconnect the faulty subsystem
or to reconfigure neighbouring subsystems, since the local
controller continues to satisfy local state constraints Xi and
therefore the influence of the reconfigured subsystem i for the
computation of Wj in the neighbouring subsystems j ∈Ni
remains bounded as before the local control reconfiguration
of i.
Scenario 2. There exists a control input sequence so that it
is possible to achieve correct fault isolation, but we cannot
guarantee stability properties x[mi]i (kd+Ti) ∈ F [mi]i at the end
of the Active Fault Isolation process for some i ∈ M+.
Depending on the level of criticality of the considered appli-
cation, the operator/decision system can decide whether to
immediately disconnect the faulty subsystem or to continue
with the local fault isolation without constraint (12) in order
to understand the source of the problem. Again, after fault
isolation we may decide to disconnect the faulty subsystem
or we can use the additional knowledge to take a decision.
Scenario 3. It is not possible to find a local control input
sequence so to achieve fault isolation (Problem (7) is not
feasible even without constraint (12)). We can therefore
decide to immediately disconnect the faulty subsystem in
order to avoid or reduce the propagation of the fault effects
in the network of the LSS. The unplugging of a subsystem
is always possible, by implying only a contraction of the set
Wj in the neighboring subsystems j ∈Ni, thus not spoiling
neighbouring subsystems‘ state constraints.
The entire procedure is repeated if and when a new fault
occurs.
VII. SIMULATION EXAMPLE
In this section, we show the effectiveness of the proposed
decentralized FTC architecture on a power network system,
composed of 5 generation areas connected through tie-lines,
as described for Scenario 2 of the Appendix in [28]. The
dynamics of each area, equipped with primary control and
linearized around the equilibrium value for all variables, are
described by the following continuous time model
x˙[mi]i = A
[mi]
ii x
[mi]
i +B
[mi]
i ui+L
[mi]
i ∆PLi +w
[mi]
i (14)
w[mi]i = ∑
j∈Ni
A[mi]i j x
[mi]
j +di
where x[mi]i = (∆θi,∆ωi,∆Pmi ,∆Pvi) is the local state, ui =
∆Pre fi is the control input of each area, and ∆PLi is the local
power load and Ni is the set of neighbouring areas directly
connected to subsystem i through tie-lines. More specifically,
the matrices of system (14) are
A[mi ]ii =

0 1 0 0
− ∑ j∈Ni Pi j
2H
[mi ]
i
− Di
2H
[mi ]
i
1
2H
[mi ]
i
0
0 0 − 1Tti
1
Tti
0 − 1RiTgi 0 −
1
Tgi
 , B[mi ]i =

0
0
0
1
Tgi
 ,
Fig. 3. Area 5. A 2D plot of the measurement x5(k) (the blue star), the
corresponding detection tube E [1]5 (k) centered in x¯
[1]
5 (k), and the domain of
attraction F [1]5 , for k = 1, . . . ,5, projected on the first two components.
A[mi ]i j =

0 0 0 0
Pi j
2H
[mi ]
i
0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
 , L[mi ]i =

0
− 1
2H
[mi ]
i
0
0

with the parameters and values as defined in [28] for the
nominal model mi = 1. We define three faulty models for
the subsystem 5: H [2]5 = 2.5, H
[3]
5 = 2.7, H
[4]
5 = 2.95. We
consider similar values for the faulty inertia constants, thus
making the isolation problem even more challenging. Each
subsystem is subject to constraints on the state ∆θi and
on the input ∆Pre fi as defined in Appendix B of [28]. We
obtain discrete-time models as in (1) by discretizing model
(14) with 1 sec sampling time. We assume the process
noise di of the discretized model is bounded by a zonotope
Di= {0.01I,0}, with I the identity matrix. The matrices K[mi]i
of each subsystem have been computed, for all mi ∈Mi
using the PnPMPC toolbox for MatLab [29]. The goal of
the control is the design of the AGC layer control in order
to restore the frequency in each area next to step loads.
At time k f = 3 the inertia constant in area 5 is decreased
from H5 = 12 to H5 = 2.5 , corresponding to a reduction of
about the 80% of the inertia. From an electrical point of view,
this represents that the generation area has lost some local
generators. In Figure 3, we illustrate the measurements and
the tubes around the nominal state of the local subsystem 5,
projected on the first two state components for k= 1, . . . ,5. It
is possible to see that the state x5(k) is contained in the tube
k = 1, . . . ,5; therefore, there is no detection before k = 6.
At time kd = 6, the passive local set-based fault detection
method is able to detect the fault. We can see in Figure 4 that
the measurement x5 at time 6 lies outside1 the corresponding
detection tube E [1]5 centered in x¯
[1]
5 (6), and therefore we have
detection. We then activate the local Active Fault Isolation
tool. Problem (7) was solved using CPLEX. After Ti= 1 step,
at time kis = 7 the computed control input u5(6) = 0.0767 is
able to separate the reachable sets of the different dynamics
and to exclude all the faults but the correct one, i.e. m5 =
1We use a 3D plot, projecting onto the first three components, to show
that the measurement is not contained in the set.
Fig. 4. Area 5 at time k= 6. A 3D plot of the measurement x5(6) (indicated
with a blue star) and the corresponding detection tube E [1]5 centered in x¯
[i]
5 (6),
projected on the first three components.
2. It was then possible to reconfigure the local controller
according to the identified novel dynamics. Since the state
has 4 components, it is not possible to show the separation
of the reachable sets in a plot.
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, a novel decentralized FTC scheme has been
proposed for the monitoring of interconnected subsystems,
using Active Fault Isolation. After fault detection, the pro-
posed method allows to determine whether it is possible to
correctly isolate the fault in a limited number of steps and
to safely reconfigure local controllers or if the disconnection
of the faulty subsystem is preferable in order to reduce the
propagation of the effects of the fault. As a future work,
we are going to investigate a distributed architecture and the
presence of measurement noise and we will provide extensive
simulation analysis.
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